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Great Men, Little Black Dresses, & the Virtues of Keeping One’s Feet on the
Ground1
By Babette Babich
In Memoriam: Mary Daly
I was born the year that Hazel Barnes’ translation of Sartre’s Being and
Nothingness first appeared, which means that I was not quite 12 when the events
of ‘68 galvanized the intellectual worlds of Europe and the United States. In fact,
as I am fond of saying, the ‘sixties’ as we think and speak of that generation,
really took place in the following decade, that is: in the 1970s, years I spent in
high school, in college, including a hitchhiking trip cross country, alone and at
grievous personal risk, especially because I was so out of step with the sexual
freedom of the times that I refused to sleep, just on principle, with any one of the
many drivers who stopped to give me a ride. I didn’t consider the danger at the
time but mostly fumed, outraged, that in more than 3000 miles (some drivers took
one not quite in the direction one wanted to go, and hitchhikers can’t be
choosers), there was not one of the men (and they were all men) who stopped to
pick me up, who did not proposition me, some more violently, some more offhandedly than others. As one guy, himself nice enough, explained, you just had
to assume that if a woman was out hitchhiking she was really interested in finding
an erotic adventure.
Not true for me: what I was really interested in was hitching a ride back to New
York from San Francisco. I was hitching, as one did in those days, because, in
my case, with no family to help out, I had no other recourse. As I said, I did not
sleep with any of them, but that option did not go without saying. Hence at the
extremes, I got shot at, I jumped from a moving car (my judo roll worked) and
otherwise endured, just in order to say ‘no’, the array of insults that were
common during the liberated hey-day of the sexual revolution: for whenever a
woman turned a man down, the reason never had anything to do with him, but
her: she was uptight or frigid, and always, always, after all, was not good looking
anyway, sort of the precursor theme to the anti-female sentiment of the current
runaway hit, in book and movie form: he’s just not that into you.
So there was a double-standard, i.e., the so-called sexual revolution was
different for women. So hitchhiking is stressful and sometimes dangerous. So
what?
What has any of this to do with philosophy? A lot, actually: everything.
And in 1979, when I went to my first APA meeting in New York City, I was struck
by two things in addition to the presidential address by Richard Rorty whose
1

This is a radically shortened version of a talk on the status of women in philosophy given at the
invitation of the graduate students at the New School, April 8, 2009.
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Mirror of Nature2 had seemed a beacon of hope in the faculty and grad student
reading group I had been part of devoted to reading Rorty’s book in the very
rigorously continental but not less pluralistically idealistic department at Stony
Brook where I took my undergraduate degree. Susan Bordo, who later went on to
write a bit on Rorty’s Cartesian vision,3 but also on body-image as a feminist
philosopher,4 was part of that reading group and had (at the time) a distinct
resemblance to Brenda Starr: red hair, looks, and the habit of combining the
convenience of battle clothes and army boots with the striking inconvenience of
complete make up. I, who have never worn make-up in my life as a time-saving
choice (my sisters did, so I have a good sense of the time investment involved),
found the combination cognitively jarring but stylistically fitting at the end of a
decade of cultural transformation.5 To talk about Bordo’s appearance is
gratuitous but I remember it while and by contrast there was nothing to say about
Rorty’s appearance: he looked ordinary, not yet as portly, though one could not
tell that then, as he would come to be. I will later return to the point that not
commenting on a man’s appearance (one way or another) seems to go without
saying.
Two things have remained with me since that first APA. Both concerned the
dissonant role of women in the academy.
Firstly, there was the overwhelming masculinity of the profession. Hotel meeting
rooms filled to the gills with almost completely male audiences listening to what
seemed universally to be male lecturers (who just happened to be delivering
analytic and stunningly boring talks).
Neither aspect of this first detail has changed much in the interim, the one
difference being that most of the speakers today tend to be grad students, still
male, still talking analytic philosophy, but grad students. Then, in the olden days,
older profs came to talk and to debate and students came to listen; now the older
profs stay home (because they are not on the program) and the students talk
(assuming they are on the program) and listen to themselves (provided they go
to anyone else’s talks at all — and at recent conferences there has been an
increasing trend towards empty rooms: the speakers speaking amongst, i.e., only
to the speakers themselves).
The second experience was more specific. One of my professors from Stony
Brook helpfully pointed out various luminaries at the smoker or evening APA
2

Richard Rorty, The Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1981).
Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 1987).
4
See, for example, Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body, Tenth
Anniversary Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
5
Bordo herself has written on such constellations, albeit in a different context. See her Twilight
Zones: The Hidden Life of Cultural Images from Plato to O.J. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999).
3
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reception, filled with masses of academics who were at the time furiously
smoking.6
There were few women among the luminaries but there, however, was Ruth
Barcan Marcus, described – and it was this description I took away with me – by
my otherwise amicable and jovial teacher as a “battle-axe.”
The first sight (of mostly men listening to mostly men) did not faze me. How could
it? It characterized my experience at Stony Brook both in the department of
biological sciences, where I began, as it also characterized the department of
philosophy which I turned to in a rage of idealistic impatience with the explicit
prohibition against defining “life” in the life sciences.7 What got to me was the
description of a famous Yale professor of logic described not in the way other
famous professors might be described but as a “battle-axe,” that is, in sexspecific terms, entailing that one could damn a woman for a character trait that
would have been described with other terms had she been male.
To this day I have not ceased to think about it.
Now we all know Bertie Russell’s charming conjugation of what he named
(upsetting linguists and grammarians everywhere) “irregular verbs”
I am firm.
You are obstinate.
He is a pig-headed fool.
Let’s try it with “battle-axe” and pretend that English has, as it does have, gender
differences or linguistic shadings as they might be applied to, say a well-known
male philosopher, let’s take Michael Dummett or you can substitute someone
else you know:

6

Today, although the reception is still called a smoker, there is, of course, no smoking but the
appellation is not simply an anachronism for the prohibition contra smoking also provides one
with the chance to hang out around the hotel entrances and look cool, in both senses of the term,
ergo a lot of people smoke ‘opportunistically’ at conferences.
7
And not a great part in protest against a research assignment which would have involved
guillotining hamsters for their ovaries. I went into biology because I liked animals. “Sacrificing”
them, even for science much less for my lab leader’s convenience, was out of the question. Very
few books engage or take up this question. A rare exception, still not bettered, reflecting on the
moral issue of science, is the book by the (post-biologist) Catherine Roberts in her Science,
Animals, and Evolution: Reflections on Some Unrealized Potentials of Biology and Medicine
(Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980). A Berkeley trained biologist, Roberts set aside her research
and turned to theoretical reflection at the beginning of her career for expressly ethical reasons.
For a more politically and sociologically attuned discussion of the epistemological implications of
experimentation, see Shiv Visvanathan, “On the Annals of the Laboratory State,” in: Ashis Nandy,
ed., Science, Hegemony, and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp. 257–288. I also address this issue in the concluding chapter of Babich, Words
in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006).
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I am spirited.
You are aggressive
He is dominating.
But, for Ruth Barcan Marcus, it would be:
I am spirited.
You are aggressive.
She is a battle-axe.
It is not my claim that it is cool or a good thing to be dominating as “he” is merely
that it is word-worlds away from being a “battle-ax” as “she” is.8 This
characterization framed the beginning of my academic career as I went to study
at Boston College, ruining my career prospects by neglecting other opportunities
(failing to apply, failing to accept acceptances) just because Hans-Georg
Gadamer whose Truth and Method and Philosophical Hermeneutics I was
reading at Stony Brook happened to be teaching there in the 80 year old flesh. It
did not occur to me to hold his age against him.
I mention Boston College not to tell you the history of my life (and I assure you I
am not doing that – I have left out all the good and the bad bits) but because it
was there that I also met one of the least appealing, that is one of the most
annoying and thus one of the most creative or radical feminist theologians of our
time, the late Mary Daly. We did not get along but Mary Daly got along with no
one and I did not take it personally. I did make an effort to understand the
phenomenon.
Now Daly, who was always introduced numerically, that is by counting her PhD’s
(she did this herself, as anyone who has met her in person can attest) and noting
the provenance of the same (Fribourg and therefore and by implication that
serves to square the PhD achievement by emphasizing that it would be gotten in
Swiss German with a fair admixture of Latin and no less Greek and
Hebrew/Aramaic), has achieved far more fame or notoriety from her classroom
restrictions than her books, The Church and the Second Sex, Beyond God the
Father, Gyn-Ecology, etc.9 And this was as true 30 years ago as it is today. In the
8

There is a wide literature on this topic but see the very forthright Julia Penelope, Speaking
Freely: Unlearning the Lies of the Fathers (London: Pergammon, 1990). For a discussion of the
very politically correct but often oppressive cooption of the political impetus of feminist critique of
language, Tania Modelski, Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a ‘Post-Feminist’
Age (New York: Routledge, 1991). One may assume that one is “past” needing Modelski’s
critical readings. I would argue that we have hardly caught up to them.
9
Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), Beyond God the
Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985 [1973]),
Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990 [1978); Pure
Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press 1984), etc. For an alternative
example of a mainstream and leading feminist theologian in the Catholic tradition, see the works
of Elizabeth Johnson, notably and very linguistically: She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist
Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992).
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theology and philosophy departments at BC, colleagues disapproved: how dare
she, they asked, ban men from her classes? Yet Daly had good pedagogical
reasons for such a ban, reasons concerning women in the classroom, and she
was not the only one with such concerns. Thus it is relevant that at the same time
as Daly instituted her notorious ban, the so-called academic “climate” for women
was beginning to attract scholarly attention, research that continues to this day,
with still-sobering results.10 As a grad student representative on a Boston College
committee (this was one of my first and unfortunately not the last of my
committee experiences) entitled “Gender Differences in Classroom Learning
Situations,” the issue of the learning climate for women dominated our
discussions, with social scientists arguing with epistemologically impeccable just
because numeric or statistical backing that the scholarly climate was then (as it,
alas, continues to be) a “chilly” one for women. As in the natural sciences, the
prospects for advancement and recognition in philosophy remain so dismal that
recently the New York Times bothered to wonder about it in an article entitled “A
Dearth of Women Philosophers.”11
At the time, in the heyday of Mary Daly’s banning men from her classes, the
chilly climate contingent argued that women suffered more from taking academic
risks than men did; that when speaking, they were not judged as favorably for the
same content as men were. In particular, and this is why it mattered on the
university level, women in the classroom found themselves far too aware of and
thus needing to take account of supposed or anticipated or recollected responses
from the men around them, such that they felt inhibited to say the least, and, so
the studies seemed to suppose, this inhibition worked on them whether they
spoke out in class or not. The same concern for the possible adverse or positive
10

See R.M. Hall & B. R. Sandler’s 1982 “The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women?” in
the “Student Climate Issues Packet,” available from the Project on the Status and Education of
Women, Association of American Colleges, 1818 R St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20009. See
further, Chilly Collective, eds., Breaking Anonymity: The Chilly Climate for Women Faculty
(Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995). See too: Virginia Valian, Why so
Slow? The Advancement of Women (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) as well as the Hunter College
Gender Equity Project reviews edited by Valian and Vita Rabinowitz for 2006 and 2007, as well
as for an overview and listing of recent literature, Joan C. Williams, Tamina Alon, and Stephanie
Bornstein, “Beyond the ‘Chilly Climate’: Eliminating Bias Against Women and Fathers in
Academe,” The NEA Higher Education Journal (Fall 2006): 79-96. And see, because promotion
and tenure often depend on student evaluations, the range of studies of student gender bias, e.g.,
J. Miller, & M. Chamberlin, “Women are Teachers, Men are Professors: A Study of Student
Perceptions.” Teaching Sociology, 28 (2000): 283-299.
11
New York Times, October 2, 2009. The Times article responded, in part, to Sally Haslanger,
“Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone),” Hypatia 23/ 2
(2008): 210-223. But see too Julie van Camp, Tenured/tenure track faculty women at 98 U.S.
Doctoral Programs in Philosophy. http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/doctoral_2004.html. Updated
4/14/08. Accessed, 9:34 PM, February 23, 2010, New York City. See more recently, Miriam
Solomon and John Clarke, “The CSW Jobs for Philosophers Employment Study,” APA
Newsletter: Feminism and Philosophy, 8/2 (Spring 2009): 3-6 and as a background perspective,
written from a mainstream feminist perspective, van Camp’s “Female-Friendly Departments: A
Modest Proposal for Picking Graduate Programs in Philosophy,” American Philosphical
Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, 3/2 (Spring 2004): 116-120.
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reactions from members of the opposite sex did not seem to be a factor in male
performance — which did not of course mean that men were unaware of the
presence of women in the class rooms, just that that presence did not seem to
handicap the kinds of questions asked, especially the kind of questions most
essential for learning: the questions that can seem foolish and not less, the other
important academic kind of question: the question that shows the depth and
reach of one’s own learning. It was her solicitude for this same circumstance that
framed Daly’s exclusion of men. This solicitude did not make her the soul of
openness or tolerance.
Stony Book, like most philosophy departments, offered only a few courses in
medieval philosophy. So, although this was not required for my studies at BC, I
took the opportunity to make life hard for myself by filling the gaps in my historical
background by taking courses in medieval philosophy which was how I found
myself in the theology department in the first place. Thus I also took courses with
the Canadian Jesuit and Thomist philosopher, Bernard Lonergan, someone even
more formidable in every regard than either Ruth Barcan Marcus or Mary Daly.
What struck me were the similarities between Lonergan and Daly. Where Daly
refused comparisons — a Hegelian as I was at the time, pre-Nietzsche as I was,
I sought to situate her approach to theology with reference to Hegel. But Daly
would have none of it. And not just Hegel. Rather than mentioning Augustine or
Tillich or Altizer (all of whom and others she cites in her own work) or indeed
Kierkegaard or any of her Boston or Cambridge colleagues: Daly insisted that her
thought was unique to her. I demurred and smiled at that (Hegelians are always
right).
I had the same experience in a course that was in every other respect utterly
different. Raising a similar query (as was my Hegelian wont) about Lonergan’s
own Hegelian schematism, I got the same insistence in a reply even more
indignant than Daly’s on the singularity of Lonergan’s thought. Coming from a
man whose method of teaching theology was to read, out loud, and without
taking questions, from his book Method in Theology, the pattern was patent.12
Let me explain this just a bit more.
When Daly who, like Lonergan, focused on her own books in her classes, told
her class that there were no Hegelian influences whatever in her thought her

12

Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972). Lonergan
was known to me for his masterwork, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1957) as well as for his helpfully clear Verbum. Of course that there
is a Hegelian connection also goes without saying and had been the subject of a then-recent
monograph: Jon Nilson, Hegel’s Phenomenology and Lonergan’s Insights A Comparison of Two
Ways to Christianity (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1979) and including, for all the
good it did me, Lonergan’s own 1980 lecture “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion,” which he
gave at the August 1980 meeting of the International Association for the History of Religions in
Winnipeg, Canada.
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refusal of comparison echoed Lonergan’s analogous refusal.13 The class
responded to Daly with either awed indulgence (her followers) or else with
amused indulgence (like me) and those who would have been non-indulgent
were, owing either to self-selection or else to her class restrictions, simply not
there. I was hardly the only student to smile at Daly’s reply and when I mentioned
this to friends I got all the indignation one might imagine. This did not happen
when I reported that Lonergan made a similar claim. Of course, the true believers
concurred: Lonergan is sui generis, utterly unique.
But when Lonergan made his declaration, it wasn’t just the true believers: the
entire class nodded in response, almost including me and I would have gone
along as I liked Lonergan personally and admired the sheer scope and
systematic achievement of his thought but I was distracted by the sudden insight
that Lonergan exemplified the “Great Man Syndrome.” Socrates had already
explicated this syndrome to the Boule of Athens assembled to hear his selfjustification or Apology. Socrates was not speaking of himself but rather of the
tendency for those reputed to have wisdom to be nonetheless limited in that
wisdom when it came to insight into their own accomplishments.
Beyond the limitations of self-knowledge, a limitation that, I think, applies to every
one of us, the point to be made is that both Mary Daly and Bernard Lonergan
were enthusiastic victims of the same Great Man Syndrome. The issue for me is
and has been that where Bernard Lonergan got away with it and was admired for
But that is to say that what is ordinary and
it, Mary Daly did not.14
understandable for a great man of thought, whether in philosophy or theology, is
not ordinary or understandable or even tolerable for a woman.
Lonergan was a great man, that is to say, he was great with all the strengths and
weaknesses that go along with that. Mary Daly’s greatness, by contrast, did not
go without saying and continues to be a sore point — one she embraced by
calling herself, as she did in a perfect provocation and as a fearless model of
reclamation,15 a “Positively Revolting Hag,”16 using a model some feminists still
13

I would later study in Germany myself and would learn from my own experience that her
insistence (like Lonergan’s) was more than a little unlikely if I also learned enough to leave Hegel
for the sake of a better reading of both Heidegger and Nietzsche: Hegel an intolerant task master,
is like an old testament divinity, brooking no competition from others in spite of the seductive
language of the dialectic which suggests otherwise.
14
Although Daly was able to resist pressure to admit male students into her classes (and offered
to tutor them individually), she was, indeed, ultimately forced to resign from Boston College, a
resignation she resisted until negotiating a final settlement in 2001. After her death on January 3,
2010 she drew considerable vitriol — still.
15
I thank Jolie Mandelbaum for kindly reminding me of this terminus as well as the complex
theoretical issues concerned. My worries in this regard are only small ones from this broader
perspective.
16
See the back cover of Mary Daly with Jane Caputi, Webster’s First New Intergalactic
Wickedary of the English Language (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). Daly defines a “positively
revolting hag” as: “a stunning, beauteous Crone; one who inspires positive revulsion from phallic
institutions and morality, inciting Others to Acts of Pure Lust.”
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follow and I find worrisome for simple empirical reasons: cheap ontic, details. The
theory seems to be that if you yourself call yourself rude and misogynistic names
those names will cease to be harmful, becoming “good things” in the end. Thus
some feminist comics like Margaret Cho and Kathy Griffin, to name only two
names, can name themselves “sluts.”17 In the same way, some social theorists
argue that prostitution is “powerful” and propose to re-write history in this mode
from Athens and Rome to Madame Pompadour and the sex-workers of our
day.18 A similar tactic has been used in Buddhist thought to call dishwashing
good, or housework a joy, diaper changing great or getting up when the baby
cries an exercise in mysticism (and note that I am not arguing that it is not).19
Rather the ontic or real-life problem will always be that calling a garbage collector
a sanitation engineer leaves the job to be done the same as it ever was. I cannot
begin to address the complex issues of prostitution here — indeed: there is
enough trouble where only the usual exchanges of capital are involved as in
dating, marriage, and the like. But on the matter of housework, I vote (as if voting
were an option) for dividing the chores, not at all equally but fairly, assuming as I
do that for the sake of reparations men might take the greater share of said
chores, given the work that has already been done by women on the domestic
side, not collectively and not in history, but in their own lives, since their mothers,
as Virginia Wolf rightly reminds us, first gave them all the peace and calm in the
world, a calm that could not but permit a certain level of inattention to the details
of what Michel de Certeau calls “everyday life.”
Thus if Daly insisted upon insisting upon her own greatness, her efforts often
backfired — and given the very nature of the great man culture, not so named by
oversight, such insistence could not but backfire, or be turned against her. Thus I
read the negative comments published on the internet in the wake of her death
as signs of the persistence of this same culture. There are exceptions like
Simone de Beauvoir (but only in part) and Hannah Arendt and one can arguably

17

See for a popular culture feminist analysis, Jessica Valenti, He’s a Stud, She’s a Slut and 49
Other Double Standards Every Woman Should Know (Berkeley: Seal Press, 2008).
18
See Nils Johan Ringdal, Love For Sale: A World History of Prostitution (New York: Grove
Press, 2005) as well as Jill Nagle, ed., Whores and Other Feminists (London: Routledge, 1997)
and for an overview the readings in Drucilla Cornell, ed., Feminism and Pornography (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), as well as Rosie Campbell and Maggie O'Neill, eds., Sex Work
Now (London: Willan Publishing, 2006) but see too Mary Beard and John Henderson, “With This
Body I Thee Worship: Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity” in M. Wyke, ed., Gender and the Body in the
Ancient Mediterranean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 56-79 as well as
Stephanie Budin, The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) and more generally James Davidson, Courtesans and
Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens (New York: Harper, 1997).
19
See Thich Nhat Hanh, Present Moment Wonderful Moment: Mindfulness Verses for Daily
Living (Fitchburg: Parallax Press 1990). For a recent theoretical discussion, see Londa
Schiebinger and Shannon K. Gilmartin, “Housework is an Academic Issue,” Academe, Vol. 96,
No. 1 January-February 2010.
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say the same for Luce Irigaray or Judy Butler but I also think it worth noting how
quickly the personal becomes relevant to laying claim to such exceptionality.20
Thus we complain that de Beauvoir was critical of and even “mean” to women
and thus “not nice” and Arendt not enough of this or that, and that Irigaray, like
Sarah Kofman, was difficult to get along with (meaning not sufficiently “nice” to
her interlocutor) and so on. Nor, which was the point of the above cited New York
Times article, “A Dearth of Woman Philosophers,” do we have such a heck of a
lot of names.
To put it in other words, far more male scholars with a certain level of
achievement can be called super-scholars without adverting to personal qualities
in the process, plus or minus, as I began above by mentioning few words about
Richard Rorty’s 1979 looks or temperament. For the great men, think of Alasdair
MacIntyre or, perhaps Simon Critchley unless you are Brian Leiter in which case
some think of someone in a Leiter-ranked department) or think of Alexander
Nehamas or Stanley Cavell or Daniel Dennett, or, just to be radical and a touch
continental, think of Slavoj Žižek, etc. The problem is that a woman’s name is not
to be had among the super-scholars of philosophy, no matter whether analytically
or continentally defined. Female philosophers tend not to be ranked (or regarded
as being) at the top of the profession and it is significant that of those fewer
female scholars their achievements tend to be restricted to fields like political
philosophy, like ethics or feminism, and that in spite of the achievements of a
Ruth Barcan Marcus.21 Or, like Martha Nussbaum, pearls and all, they can be
very good little girls indeed. Failing that, this we know, they are horrid.
Feet on the Ground
I have sought with the above reflections to argue that the promises of the 1960’s
and 1970’s, especially the women’s movement, have yet to bear significant fruit
in the academy. A handy-dandy wiki-check on the net yields the claim that “U.S.
Department of Education reports indicate that philosophy is one of the least
proportionate, and possibly the least proportionate, fields in the humanities with
respect to gender,”22 with a rather dismal addendum reporting that in “2004, the
percentage of Ph.D.s in philosophy going to women reached a record high
20

Thus Haslanger reminds us that “Philosophy departments often are socially dysfunctional
places. It is afamiliar joke that (male) philosophers are poorly socialized.” Haslanger, “Changing
the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy," p. 217. Her recommendation, be it noted, is that
one change the “climate” (ideology, culture) for women in philosophy departments by making
men more polite, more socialized, etc. and not by suggesting that women who have the traits
men have be thought of as one thinks of men, that is with respect. See for an extended note on
this, my comment, “Hey, Can’t You Smile?” Radical Philosophy, 160 (March/April 2010): 36-38.
21
Of course there are exceptions and I would hardly deny this. My concern here addresses the
rarity of the same.
22
Michael T. Nettles, Laura W. Perna, and Ellen M. Bradburn. Salary, Promotion, and Tenure
Status of Minority and Women Faculty in U.S. Colleges and Universities, NCES 2000–173. U.S.
Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. [1993 National Study of
Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF:93)] Project Officer: Linda J. Zimbler. Washington, DC: 2000.
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percentage: 33.3%.”23 In 2007, according to the NCES report, 54% of all
doctorates went to women.24 What is significant is that, despite this numeric
advantage at the starting gate, women have continued to be represented by a
much smaller proportion in their respective professions, especially including
philosophy, a percentage that diminishes as one goes up the academic ladder.
And I am here to tell you that when you get to the top there is no top there, not
unless you are deferential and polite, have good social skills, and bat your eyes.
Until you age of course. Then you will be either a battle-axe or a mindless biddy
(even niceness will not help you here) and nothing in-between.
If the women’s liberation movement sought equality in general, that is: not to be
judged on the basis of sex (which includes gender-bias and among other things
lookism, ageism, freedom of sexual orientation, and this includes but is not only a
right to same-sex- or trans-orientation), and I mean this as a lamentable
minimum, more than forty years later we are nowhere near such equality.
At best we have might have equal opportunity for jobs, yet we do not have even
that, (and it is still more absurd to say, as one has to say, that we do not have
equal pay: junior males in my department are paid more than I am) and at best
we might have child-care at the work place and yet we do not have even that. I
say “at best” with reference to the last just because the example of child-care
alone exemplifies how far we have not come: the issue of child-care is meant to
facilitate women in the work place, including the university and yet it is a nonissue for men. The idealist in me insists on believing that it should be a non-issue
for women, the empiricist in me knows just by taking a look that it is not so.
In my department, in every department I have worked at, as in any department I
know of, the majority of my philosophical colleagues are men and when I stop to
think about it, I am at the time of this writing and have been for some time now,
the only female full professor in philosophy at Fordham, not that I have any credit
for this achievement in my department and the rank, although I value it, offers me
little, in fact: no power by contrast with my colleagues. And the only point of
power is by contrast with one’s colleagues. We are primates and power, to be
power, is about respect.
But that could be me. Note that as a woman, I have learned to assume that
whatever limitations I confront in the profession are probably personal rather than
endemic, rather than political. And to say that I myself am inclined to think in this
fashion, although it is objectively incorrect, is fairly remarkable as I began by
23
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underscoring that I grew up at the tail edge of a generation that emphasized that
the personal was always the political. Indeed, my own research emphasizes the
importance of adverting to political influences where one does not always see
them in academic philosophy in the case of analytic versus continental
philosophy25 and my ongoing work examines the role of politics in both science
and the philosophy of science.26
Here: I am interested in the judgments we make that inform our positive and
negative assessments of who is socialized and who does the “socializing,” just to
use Sally Haslanger’s terminology.27 Along the way I raise the question of men’s
clothes (and women’s shoes) in order to pose the question of who gets to look at
whom. And this is where real life phenomenology comes in.
Dress and Undress: Guerilla Phenomenology
Philosophy in the grand (aka: old) tradition of Thales is the tradition of distracted
philosophers. If we include the Cynics, we one can also lose the clothes and
every other kind of social grace.28 Some literalist scholars argue that Socrates
shows symptoms of what today we call Asperger’s syndrome or a mild autism, or
worse, if we take Plato’s word for it (and Plato’s ironic style makes this
dangerous), Socrates was quite genuinely catatonic from time to time. In the
Symposium, a social dialogue if there ever was one, Socrates is presented as a
poster child for Haslanger’s “poor socialization” — joining the other guests only
when the meal is half over, a point stylistically highlighted by earlier sending
someone to call him, and when he refuses to respond, by explaining his behavior
on his behalf.29 Alcibiades, who comes in even later than Socrates, offers us the
image of Socrates, in the midst of battle, frozen in thought in spite of the cold,
throughout the night to the morning,30 Socrates, true to his nature, was so
detached from the goings on that when everyone else fell exhaustedly asleep,
departed unfazed to attend to the day.
The first philosopher, Thales, had the right (he claimed it, suffered or enjoyed the
perspective it gained for him) to be the one who falls into the well. Women, it
seems, then and now, have only the right to be practical, i.e., not philosophical:
they have the right not to “want” to be the one in the well. They can play the role
25
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of the Thracian milkmaid, laughing at Thales (and doubtless they will be told that
that will be the “better part” for them to emulate) but they can’t (and shouldn’t
want to) trade place with Thales.31
Thus and to this day, only the men have the socially problematic (pace
Haslanger) yet, so I would argue and so Daly’s pedagogy also underlined,
philosophically indispensable right to fall, as it were, into the well. Thus today’s
women still, it seems, have the option of being the passing milkmaid and one can
imagine women academics of two kinds, the Marthas and the Marys, that is the
ones who tease or else those who avert their eyes when Saul Kripke or some
other male philosopher has his fly undone or shirt/hair/face unkempt, as indeed
this can also apply (although he does indeed favor bowties) to Jean-Luc Marion,
thereby and neatly covering the profession both analytic and continental by
pointing to a range of sartorially insouciant or incompetent professors on either
side and by naming such names I mean to underscore the point that such
incompetence is to their credit. Simon Critchley himself, a t-shirt and jeans guy
from way back, takes insouciance so far that both undergraduates and journalists
can get carried away by his style.
Why does it seem to be pushing things a bit to talk about Simon Critchley’s
clothes or, just to add a positive note, Alexander Nehamas’ rather impeccable
shoes, not to mention the distracted fall out of Kripke’s couture? My point is that
Kripke’s messiness is part of his reputation and that that is part of his reputation
for genius. Do we have women philosophers of this kind? Maybe we do, my point
will be that we do not think of them in the same way.
Think again of Mary Daly, attacked in life for her style of writing and not less for
her style of dress and personal demeanor and audacity for blocking men from
her classes (at a university that, be it noted, only became coeducational as
Boston College did in 1970). Women who buck the trend suffer.
This dyadic difference is arguably a matter of sex not gender and the detail is not
limited to the academy. If you pass a man of ordinary middle age wearing a
casual shirt and a casual pair of pants you will not even notice the detail of his
attire. What do clothes have to do with it? Put a jacket and tie on the guy and
he’s dressed for the finest restaurant, and these days, he can even skip the tie.
The phenomenon stands out in contrast with what can be observed of a Friday
evening in New York (or because this is NY, any day or evening will do).
Go and do a little ad hoc phenomenology, using your observations and your own
variations, and hence with and on yourself and your judgment, as you wander
down the street on such evenings (assuming you are not part of the phenomenon
yourself, as you might well be). Look for the well-dressed young women out for
the night, whether with or without a date, but a comparative observation, if you
mean to make one, can only be made when you can check out her companion.
31
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She may be wearing a little black dress or the equivalent, high heels, stockings,
have newly polished nails, newly coiffed hair, and underneath taken more care
with her undergarments than even her mother would have recommended in the
case of an accident, If her companion is her own age, almost invariably he will
be dressed as he was the whole day (though the more fashion-conscious young
fellow may have switched the day’s t-shirt for a t-shirt for the evening, etc.). If he
is an older man, he may well be wearing a suit, an article of “dress clothing,”
which even including one of the more complicated of the limited styles of knotting
a tie, never takes more than ten minutes to don, shoes and all, or he may have
the Euro, I-am-still-young look just described.
What is important is that however casually or formally he is dressed, he will get to
have his feet — every last inch of his feet — on the ground.
Men are not objectified on the street, and this is so despite the commercial
success of metrosexual products (which I am all for, you will have noted my
enthusiasm for men’s haberdashery and in general anything to do with male
beauty). I have in the past encouraged women in the courses I rarely, but
occasionally, give on feminism to follow up their own readings of Sartre’s
discussion of phenomenology, in terms of perception and consciousness (but not
less with reference to de Beauvoir) by a similar kind of practice or
phenomenological free variation on the street, using one’s own glance or “look”
to do so.
Just as Sartre’s account of intentional consciousness — the subject-objectifying
consciousness and its reciprocal subjected modality — describes a man on a
park bench in order to reductively note the phenomenon of being seen as
opposed to having only the transparent sense of himself as the one who has a
regard for what he looks at, that is, qua conscious subject rather being reduced
to — and it is essential to note that is a reduction to the status of — an object for
another consciousness. As Sartre who was a marvelously consequent Hegelian
as much as a Husserlian/Heideggerian, “‘Being-seen-by-the-other’ is the truth of
‘seeing the other.’ He is that object in the world which determines an internal flow
of the universal, an internal hemorrhage which bleeds in his direction.” 32
Consider what a difference it makes to be a female, not as a subject of desire be
it in Hegel’s or in Butler’s genitive subversion/inversion, but as a Sartrean
consciousness, as a conscious subject for whom there is a still subjected world
of objects that can turn the tables on the observer, in the case of other subjects
of consciousness, simply by being there: “I am seen,”33 as Sartre has it.
To see this, it can help to experiment by varying, indeed by inverting the example
Sartre suggests. Instead of Sartre’s male subject gazing around the park as he
32
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does as a sovereign subject, objectifying all he surveys until he is seen by
another (man), try varying the phenomenological exercise by varying not the
object but the observer.
The experiment is simple, one need only walk down the street and consider the
men passing by. Just look directly at them. For most women raised in an AngloEuropean culture (and I am not talking about other cultures for simplicity’s sake),
this will not be easy, inasmuch as most women are attuned to worry about their
looks, and thus are concerned with how they might be seen rather than with
looking at others (an exception, de Beauvoir is smashing on this,34 is made in the
case of other women: there one notices every flaw in what one revealingly calls
her “looks,” meaning, of course, how she looks to men).
Thus one might have a bit to do to check one’s own consciousness in the
process: at issue is not at all a matter of aesthetic judgment, at issue is not
whether you like/dislike the men in question as this so often and very quickly can
become a desire to look for a look, as Sartre would speak of it, that is, to look for
a response to your own appearance or presence or being and the possibilities of
the same in the process. Checking one’s own consciousness in this way
corresponds to the routine matter of the suspension of judgment or bracketing
that Sartre speaks of, this is the epoché as Husserl speaks of it, as Nietzsche too
speaks of it, both echoing the ancient Stoics. Thus bracketing your usual
assumptions, and exactly without smiling, simply look over the men you pass on
the street: look them up and down: check them out without inviting them to do the
same. Look at them directly, in other words, as they might look at you (not out of
the corner of your eye).35 You can practice looking at men straight on after they
have passed you (men often look at women this way, since the whole point of the
action is appraisal rather than invitation) and then try looking at them head on as
they pass.
When students of mine tried this, they reported that the reactions of men were
the most striking. Men were confused, discomfited, checked to see if their flies
were undone, their jackets misbuttoned or spotted, looked around to see who
else might be the possible object of such “inspection.” In some cases, so I was
told, men even lost their footing, stumbling on the sidewalk, so off-putting was the
experience of being looked at in this way.36
Sartre himself describes the equivalent of such stumbling when he seeks to
exemplify what is meant by being an object for consciousness by using the
34
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example first of projecting one’s consciousness (the usual directionality of
intentionality) by using the example of looking through a key hole. All of one’s
consciousness is ecstatic to oneself and in such a circumstance one is pure
transcendence. In such attentiveness to what may be going on the other side of
the key-hole, Sartre’s point is that one’s consciousness of one’s own bodily being
along with its discomfort, volatizes as one’s awareness of one’s own body
disappears into a sheerly objective instrumentality for a consciousness that is
now and utterly outside oneself: the whole of one’s consciousness is absorbed
by the object attended to. In this, nothing about the awkwardness of such a
situation has anything self-referential or self-aware about it, one crouches thus
and so: the position is wholly instrumental, thus one adjusts one’s face to the
side, squashing it without feeling it, squinting into the key hole just so: “But all of
a sudden, I hear footsteps in the hall! Some one is looking at me!”37 Being seen,
the very possibility that one may have been seen in just this way, just this bodily
disposition (the very same position heretofore matter of inattention, one way or
the other), all one’s consciousness crashes back instantaneously, not only
bringing to instant awareness one’s bodily awkwardness or discomfort but one
(body, conscious intentionality) is just as suddenly reduced to being no more
than an object for an other, an object for the gaze — judgment, presumptions,
conclusions — of the other. Thus Sartre reflects that when I recognize that
someone sees me, that someone is looking at me: “What does that mean? It
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications
appear in my structure…I see myself because somebody sees me…” 38 And our
only concern, our anxiety in such situations will be all about determining, as well
as we can, whether (or not) the other person, was in fact (or only seemingly)
looking at us? We have a great many devices to pretend that the rare occasions
where we fail to see someone are more common than they are. We affect
disconcern, disinterest, inattention. But we only have to do so because of the
extraordinary sweep and world-collapsing power of the gaze.
To turn the gaze around a bit, it is precisely relevant that a naked woman
represents (conveniently enough for the heterosexual male spectator) the erotic
signifier par excellence. When naked men are depicted, the stylizations or
signifiers attending that representation make it plain that such represented
images are intended not for the appreciation or admiration of heterosexual
women but and rather for homosexual men. The subjects of sexual desire are
men when it comes to male objects of desire and men and women, heterosexual
and homosexual alike, must desire what heterosexual men desire. Thus it makes
a difference that heterosexual men seeking pornographic images are offered a
wide and seemingly inexhaustible range of beautiful women where supposed
pornography for women is not only limited but often represents, as if this were a
good thing, images of ordinarily and no more than ordinarily attractive men,
37
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sometimes accompanied with helpful glosses explaining that women, unlike men,
are not interested in male beauty and are disinclined to celebrate male bodies
(this is often coupled with the nauseating repetition of the claim that penis size, in
whatever direction, is irrelevant to a woman’s pleasure) and are so unmoved by
male youth that they find old men attractive. Thus contemporary love stories in
film and on television almost always show beautiful women (let us consider the
model and the geek shows, and note immediately that one has already assumed
the model to be female and the geek to be male) passing over beautiful or even
just attractive men for the awkward and, seemingly so universal is this, the
obligatorily unattractive male hero, who is described as ‘sensitive’ (a code-word
for self-preoccupied). Woody Allen’s films are comic depictions of the
indefatigable allure the unattractive and older man is supposed (that’s just the
way women are) to hold for smart, beautiful, younger women, and there are
many other such films – indeed films following this model have increased in
recent years, think of Adam Sadler or Will Ferrell and still others.
There is, of course, much more to say on this but to conclude I turn briefly to
Austrian novelist, Elfriede Jelinek’s reflections on power and desire in order to
raise the question of how this power dynamic denominates an established
tradition of theological and philosophical love affairs.
Jelinek on Women and Power
The problem of Eros, as already suggested above, is also the problem of sexual
desire and that is in the case of women often less, and this is no indictment but a
lament, a matter of desiring than it is a matter of, that is, that it is about being
desired. Luce Irigaray has written on the difference it makes to write on the
matter of eros and love as on the body and on perception as a woman and thus
explicitly in contrast with the perspectives that predominate in the literature.39
But what this means in real life practice, as Elfriede Jelinek, author of the novel
Women as Lovers,40 has explained, turns upon nothing but the issue of the
status of women as such and in society and that means as compared with men.
What is at stake as Jelinek explains it reflects the dynamics of “a Hegelian
relationship between master and slave.”41 With respect to desire, that is to say of
desiring, and hence and also with respect to desirability — who is desired, who
gets to desire — Jelinek makes the inherently provocative observation that “as
long as men are able to increase their sexual value through work, fame, or
wealth, while women are only powerful through their body, beauty and youth,
nothing will change.”42 But this is not what one wants to hear, it is not what one
wants to believe. For the ordinary woman, sure, one can agree, but for a woman
distinguished by her creativity, her fame, even her wealth, surely that must
39
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change everything? So it can’t be true that “nothing will change” — surely, things
have already begun to change? Surely by the time one gets to be Jelinek’s age
or attain her status, that age and status must make a difference? Thus Jelinek’s
surprised interviewer corrected her — surely, she asked such a claim could not
be said to hold for famous women such as Jelinek herself. Not to be
misunderstood, Jelinek again emphasized in reply that a “woman who becomes
famous through her work reduces her erotic value. A woman is permitted to chat
or to babble but speaking in public is still the greatest transgression.”43
This was manifestly not what her interviewer wanted to hear, ergo the interview
featured the hostile title, “A Gloom of Her Own.” It is probably as impolitic to
repeat this in the current context but it remains the case that Jelinek would not be
the only celebrated woman literary artist one to have made such observations or
suffered from them.
Indeed, one can read Anne Carson’s later poems after her lover/husband
rejected her, published after the extraordinary success of Carson’s Eros the
Bittersweet44 for an extraordinarily honest and not less painful articulation of the
same lived ramifications of the same phenomenon to which Jelinek refers.
About herself, in her own lyric voice, Carson writes:
Loyal to nothing
my husband. So why did I love him from early girlhood to late middle age
and the divorce decree came in the mail?
Beauty. No great secret. Not
ashamed to say I loved him for his beauty.
As I would again
if he came near. Beauty convinces. You know beauty makes sex
possible.
Beauty makes sex sex.
You if anyone grasp this – hush, let’s pass.45
The poem is extraordinary and I am not “reading” it here except to note its
ontic content. What Jelinek does not do in her writing, what Carson does not do
except between the lines of her poems, Jelinek does clarify clarifies when
pressed by Solomon’s lack of sympathy no less than her Solomon’s
unquestionably good journalist’s insistence or investigative instinct, Jelinek
repeats: “A woman’s artistic output makes her monstrous to men if she does not
know how to make herself small at the same time and present herself as a
commodity. At best people are afraid of her.”46
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If literary or artistic fame does not, as Jelinek argues, enhance a woman’s erotic
value, it makes a difference of a negative and still more dismal kind that women
tend not to be highly ranked in the academy to begin or to end with. Thus such
valuation turns out to be anything but unconflicted and in this is so even in
exceptional cases. And what about those love affairs?
The Life of the Mind as Love Affair: Héloïse, Hannah (Arendt), and Lou
(Salomé)
Love has been part of the substance of philosophy from the start, just to speak of
Empedocles but also of Plato, that is to say, as he attributes such a discourse to
Socrates, as he attributes such a discourse to Diotima, the Mantinean hetaira.
And love and inclination, as every one of us knows is the same familiarity that
absorbs us in our reading of Carson on Eros or in Jelinek’s and de Beauvoir’s
reflections on love.
Love as Carson has also underlined it for us, is and can only be an erotic figure
as a mark of loss. And we are used to the power of figures of lack or loss. Thus
Hannah Arendt focuses her doctoral dissertation on love in St. Augustine and
reviewers and commentators muse that the theme was inspired by the erotic by
its loss in and her personal life.47 For Arendt’s problem was that her lover — she
had others then and since, and more than one husband, but we only care about
the most famous of her lovers — Martin Heidegger was a married man.
But if Arendt is condemned for this, How could she love him? Is her dissertation
any good? Is it anything more than a response to him? Where Arendt is
diminished or loses face — How could she love him! — Heidegger too is
condemned for the liason. Curiously, the condemnation lends Heidegger a bit
more depth.
Thus Giorgio Agamben writes that so far from lacking a reference to love as is
typically argued by those who complain that Being and Time focuses solely on
death and anxiety, one can argue that Being and Time, simply given their love
affair, was framed by or conceived “under the sign of love.”48
So too, according to the Fullbrooks, Ed and Kate, was the writing of Sartre’s
Being and Nothingness.49 Indeed, the Fullbrooks argue persuasively that without
de Beauvoir’s philosophical influence, on every level that mattered, philosophical,
conceptual and writerly compositional, there would be no Sartre as we know him.
We could add the importance of Ilsetraut Hadot for Pierre Hadot’s research and
for many others here to remain unnamed names. But such parallels lack the
enduring fascination of Heidegger and Arendt.
47
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What about Arendt and Heidegger? Politics? Well, the relationship preceded and
survived Nazism. Anti-Semitism? Also complicated. Perhaps their age
difference? And perhaps and for me arguably, and this is what I take from
George Steiner, though to be sure this is not the point Steiner means to make, it
is the power differential that surrounds a relationship between student and
teacher? It is also just where we write ourselves into the imaginary, vicariously
lived constellation. In other words, when we think of Hannah and Arendt we are
not thinking of their meetings in restaurants and café’s, as older friends, as
indeed, and this is what upset Elfriede: old lovers.
In the context of that love affair at its inception, in the most important place of all,
literally so, for memory and time, writing in the very first letter to pass between
them, Heidegger tells Arendt that a “good girl,” that is, that Hannah herself, must
be careful of the risks of attending to higher things — noting “the forced
academic activity of many” of her sex, remembering as must also have been
present to Arendt’s own mind that Heidegger’s had met his wife Elfriede likewise
as his student — and thus be sure to avoid sullying her pure “girlish” soul.50 This
complex encouragement, preserved in the first letter of their correspondence,
may well be among the reasons Arendt always declined to be identified as, to be
titled a philosopher.51
Steiner who, when speaking of Heidegger and Arendt, refers to neither Agamben
nor Irigaray (or anyone else for that matter), installs Heidegger in the place of
Peter Abelard in the lover’s square, an installation unmanning Heidegger and
writing Hannah Arendt into the nun’s position, with Héloïse.52 As a set construct,
Steiner’s assemblage reminds us of the old claim that philosophy begins in
gossip (another way to translate the famous first line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics).
And because we are here talking about gossip, or love affairs in Heidegger’s
case, Heidegger, it should be underscored, instigates the high erotic move of
50
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evasion. But perhaps it was Heidegger’s refusal of Arendt precisely as his
student — Heidegger would hand Arendt off to his friend Karl Jaspers for her
doctoral work — a move that seemingly worked as the master’s move that like
Socrates, so Lacan will tell us (here following Nietzsche),53 assured his enduring
erotic allure. Deferral works in the way consummation never does.
Steiner presents his own “lessons” beyond the cheap, ontic reality of sexual
harassment — Steiner has no patience with the language and imputations of
unwanted attentions (how could there be anything but mutuality here, albeit on a
clearly unequal level, Steiner seems to ask?), nor does he have any time to
consider the possibility of less than spiritual, less than gentle consequences of
such mismatched seduction (again, on both sides).
The masters, be it noted, never want to be masters at this level. Here is the
chance to return to the Shropshire of their remembered, or unremembered,
fulfilled or unfulfilled youth. And to be sure, for such literal minded thinkers of the
old school, sexual harassment would be and is in fact a woefully inadequate term
for the student’s intellectual betrayal, for the frustrated hope and for the wronged
innocence that teachers of a past generation can never imagine.
Never, never ever.
Teaching, to paraphrase Nietzsche, is so erotic. But for whom? Whose eros if
not the master’s erotic ideal: for we are not talking about a student playground,
youth on youth.
Nietzsche himself was in this regard no outsider but stood full in the company of
the masters — professors, teachers.
For his own part Nietzsche himself did not, so he assured Lou Salomé in a
disarmingly innocent protestation of his “intentions,” merely or only want
someone to act as his secretary and practical assistant in household affairs, he
wanted a — she could be his — pupil. She, of course, never wanted to be so
lucky.
Why do we persistent in calling Lou Salomé by her first name, “Lou” countless
commentators write, just where we do not refer to Nietzsche as Friedrich (forget
Fritz or Freddy)?
Why is Arendt almost always emphatically Hannah Arendt even for those who
write about her political thought. Heidegger is never called Martin, save in the
context of a love story?

53

See further, Babich, “On the Order of the Real: Nietzsche and Lacan” in: David Pettigrew and
François Raffoul, eds., Disseminating Lacan (Albany. State University of New York Press, 1996),
pp. 48-63.
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It is significant that the paradigmatic love story for academic masters is that of
Héloïse and Abelard. Peter Abelard was an unusually gifted troubadour,
exceptionally successful with all the women who heard him, as Héloïse would
remind him in one of her later letters, was the teacher and by 22 years the senior
of Héloïse. Heidegger, the teacher, this is the point of Steiner’s figuring, was 17
years older than Arendt, the student, who would years later, just like Héloïse and
despite separation in distance and long silences, would still remember Heidegger
as a hidden king. Nor am I saying that she was wrong on any level. I am only
talking about the way we speak of Heidegger, the way we speak of Arendt.
The figuration of the names of Héloïse and Abelard, i.e., named by first and last
names, exemplifies a pattern we know and use still in daily life. The woman we
call by her first name, as if we ourselves were on intimate terms with her, the
man only by his last name: Héloïse and Abelard, never called Peter. Did Héloïse
even have a last name? Of course she might have had, but it has never been
used when speaking of her. She was the niece of one Canon Fulbert, who
arranged Abelard as her tutor (the same Fulbert who would ensured Abelard’s
castration following his seduction and marriage of his neice).
Perhaps we are all of us vicarious masters, to take over Steiner’s phrase, and
perhaps it is thus that we, male or female, assume the right of speaking on a first
name basis whenever we speak of women.54
If Nietzsche was correct to upbraid or criticize philosophers for what he
diagnosed as their “lack of love,”55 his point was directed less to the
philosophers’ innocence or their deficiencies in matters erotic (as sex-manual
mad or just gender scholars have assumed)\56 than the philosophers’ lack of
critical concern with the “question” of love.
Love in the process, this is the legacy of what Heidegger names formal
indication, obscures the character of this solicitude. Failing the exigent reticence
of love, the castrated lover embraces the life and the values of a monk but the
philosopher runs the risk of becoming what Nietzsche called a “grey” scientist, a
mere scholar, a joyless aspirant to wisdom. Worse still, and this is the failure of
philosophy itself for Heidegger, the philosopher can become no more than a man
of science, dedicated to the calculation of practical knowledge, a calculation of
security that is for Heidegger as it would also have been for Nietzsche no
different from the calculation of the man of faith.
54

We even extend this intimacy to women we are not supposed to like, like Nietzsche’s sister,
Elisabeth, like Heidegger’s wife, Elfriede, or Wagner’s wife, Cosima, etc.
55
“Ach dieser Mangel an Liebe in diesen Philosophen, die immer nur an die Ausgewählten
denken un nicht so viel Glauben zu ihrer Weisheit haben. Es muss die Weisheit wie die Sonne
für jedermann scheine: und ein blasser Stahl selbst in die niedrigste Seele hinabtauchen können”
Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studien-Ausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), Vol. 7, pp. 720-721.
56
See further on this question Babich, “Nietzsche and Eros Between the Devil and God’s Deep
Blue Sea: The Erotic Valence of Art and the Artist as Actor — Jew — Woman,” Continental
Philosophy Review, 33 (2000): 159-188.
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And love always leaves us back where we began.
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